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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
UTAH BANK & TRUST,
a Utah Corporation,
Plaintiff-Resporulent

Case No.

vs.

16788

JAMES H. QUINN and
JAMES H. QUINN, Jr.,
Deferulants-.A. ppellants

RESPONDENT'S BRIEFSTATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action by plaintiff against defendants seeking to recover a deficiency judgment after disposition of collateral.
DISPOSITION BELOW
The Court entered judgment for the plaintiff based upon the
verdict of the Jury granting plaintiff a deficiency judgment in the
sum of $148,387.61 plus costs and attorney fees.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Decision affirming lower court judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The appellants are the Defendants, Dr. James H. Quinn and
his son, James H. Quinn, Jr. (Jay Quinn) The respondent is the
Plaintiff, Utah Bank & Trust.
Jay Quinn was the President of Alpine-Rennsport, a car dealership in Salt Lake City. The plaintiff provided financing for much
of the inventory of the company on a trust receipt basis. Dr. Quinn
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signed a Continuing Guaranty in favor of the plaintiff to guarantee
the obligations of the company.
It is worthy to report in this sequence two seemingly unrelated
matters that become material at a later time:
-The first is that Plaintiff had previously granted unto Jay Quinn
a personal loan of $8,500.00. (Tr. 19)
-The second incident occurred in May 1977 wherein Jay Quinn
came into the bank and requested that the bank wire the
sum of $41,400.00 to an eastern location. The check that
Quinn used in paying for the wire which was drawn on
another bank, was not honored and was never paid. (Tr.
19, 20)

In December 1977, the corporation sold some of the cars out of
trust in that they, upon receiving the sales price from various cars,
failed to pay any of the proceeds to the bank. (Tr. 13, 219) The
amount that was sold out of trust was in the sum of $57 ,500.00.
(Tr. 220)
On December 17, 1977, Mr. George Cook, Branch Manager of
plaintiff, after notifying Jay Quinn and others, repossessed the car
inventory of the corporation-which consisted of thirteen cars. A
boat was also repossessed. (Tr. 12, 22) Two of the cars were returned to Jay Quinn so that he could trade them in on a car for his
personal use. (Tr.. 22)
On December 23, 1977, Cook and Mr. M. H. Atwood, Executive
Vice-President of the plaintiff, met with Jay Quinn and Dr. Quinn
to discuss the matter. At this time the following pertinent events
occurred:
-The Defendants signed a Promissory Note in the amount of $198,240.00 payable April 21, 1978. (Tr. 18, 19) The amount
of the note was based upon the following:

$ 41,400.00

Dishonored check given to bank
to pay for a bank wire. (Tr. 19,
20)

8,500.00

Personalloan (Tr. 19)
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57,500.00

Amount sold out of trust. (Tr.
220)

90,840.00

Remaining amount of flooring
obligation.

$198,240.00

-All present discussed the matter of disposition of the automobiles
and boat. Jay Quinn indicated that he had a number of
friends that were car dealers and he preferred that the
cars be placed with one or more of them for sale. (Tr. 22,
86) It was mutually decided that the automobiles be sold
through local car dealers.
-Jay Quinn pledged his interest in a house, by way of an Assignment of Real Estate Contract, as security for the note.
-There was a discussion and understanding among the parties that
there would be a deficiency even after applying the sales
proceeds of the collateral. There was some mention by
Dr. Quinn that he would sell some property in Texas to
cover the remaining deficiency. (Tr. 86)
Shortly after the December 23, 1977, meeting the parties undertook to sell the cars and the boat. With respect to the efforts to do
so, these pertinent events transpired:
-A few days after the December 23 meeting, Jay Quinn called
George Cook and informed him that he had made arrangements with Dewey Wood Motors to display and sell some
of the cars on their lot. (Tr. 22) Accordingly, seven of
the eleven cars were moved to the Dewey Wood Motors'
lot. One car was sold. (Tr. 23)
-The cars were thereafter moved to other lots in order to obtain better prices. (Tr. 24)
-Jay Quinn left for Arizona shortly after December 23 and was
there until approximately January 2, 1978. He was in
Arizona during some of January 1978 and moved to Arizona finally in February 1978. (Tr. 198)
-There were a number of expenditures for repairs of the cars to
make them ready for sale. The cars were all used and in
less than top condition. (Tr. 68-7 4)
-At the time the boat was picked up it was reported by Jay Quinn
that it had been winterized. (Tr. 35) Jay Quinn's manager also verified that Jay Quinn reported to him that
the boat was prepared for winter. (Tr. 211)
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-At the time the boat was being prepared for sale, it was noticed
that there was a cracked block.
-The boat was advertised for sale in the newspaper on three different occasions and by word of mouth. (Tr. 33) Plaintiff
received many phone calls and much interest was shown
concerning the boat. The boat was sold on March 26,
1979, for $3,000.00 as is; which was based upon the highest offer given. ·
-By way of recapitulation the cars were sold as follows:
Date (1978)

Description

Automobile Dealer
Location of Sale

Amount

Jan. 19
1975 Ford Granada Dewey Wood Motors $ 1,500.00
Feb. 17
1973 Jaguar
Aagaard Motors
8,500.00
Mar. 13
1973 Porshe
Ride-a-Way Motors
7,600.00
Mar. 21
1975 Ferrari
Aagaard Motors
13,500.00
Mar. 21
1974 Audi
Ride-a-Way Motors
2,500.00
Mar. 21
1975 Porshe
Aagaard Motors
11,500.00
Apr. 25
1975 Alfa Romeo Aagaard Motors
4,500.00
May 5
1973 Porshe
Aagaard Motors
7,100.00
June 20
1975 Toyota P /U R. Kingsland*
2,600.00
June 27
1973 BMW
Aagaard Motors
2,500.00
July 13
1973 BMW
Aagaard Motors
3,000.00
*R. Kingsland was not a car dealer but an individual who purchased
the car after reading an ad in the newspaper.
-Jay Quinn acquired a buyer for the house which was pledged as
security, and the house was sold on March 27, 1978. The
net equity realized from the sale of the house was in the
amount of $23,854.60 which was applied to the reduction
of the note. (Tr. 37, Ex. 17-P)
-After applying the proceeds from the sale of all of the cars, the
boat, and the house to the promissory note and adding
appropriate interest, the balance due as of September 5,
1979, was in the amount of $148,387.61. (Tr. 41, Ex.
17-P)
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE FAILURE OF THE PLAINTIFF TO GIVE NOTICE
OF THE SALE OF THE COLLATERAL DOES NOT PRECLUDE THE PLAINTIFF FROM OBTAINING A DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT.
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At trial the court held as a matter of law that the Plaintiff did
not give Defendants written notice of the sale of the collateral. As
previously indicated, the collateral was repossessed on December 17,
1977. On December 23, 1977, both of the defendants met with representatives of the bank during which time a discussion was held
concerning disposition of the collateral. It was suggested by Jay
Quinn, and there was a consensus among the parties, that the automobiles should be sold by display on used car lots. Seven of the automobiles were originally displayed on the Dewey Wood's car lot at
the initial suggestion of Jay Quinn. All but one of the automobiles
were sold on used car lots after display.
The jury found as fact by way of special verdicts the following:
PROPOSITION NO. 1
Was the disposition of the collateral by Utah Bank & Trust
made in a commercially reasonable manner? Yes.
PROPOSITION NO. 3
The court has instructed you that the plaintiff failed to give
written notice to the defendants of the proposed sale of the collateral. Please answer the following: What loss, if any, was
caused to the defendants by the failure to give notice of the sale
of the collateral?
Amount: None.
Statutory references applicable to this case are from the Uniform
Commercial Code, Title 70 A, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as
amended:
70 A-1-106.

Remedies to be Liberally Administered.

The remedies provided by this act shall be liberally
administered to the end that the aggrieved party may be put in
as good a position as if the other party had fully performed but
neither consequential or special nor penal damages may be had
except as specifically provided in this act or by other rule of
law. (Emphasis added)
(1 )

70 A.-9-501. Default

( 3) To the extent that they give rights to the debtor and
impose liabilities on the secured party, the rule stated in the subsections referred to below may not be waived or varied except
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as provided with respect to compulsory disposition of collateral
(subsections (I) of Section 70 A-9-505) and with respect to redemption of collateral (Sections 70 A-905 ( 6) but the parties
may by agreement determine the standards by which the fulfillment of these rights amd duties is to be measured if such standards are not manifestly unreasonable. (Emphasis added)

70.A.-9-504. Secured Parties Right to Dispose of Collateral
.A.fter Default-Effective Disposition
( 2) If the security interest secures an indebtedness, the
secured party must account to the debtor for any surplus, and,
unless otherwise agreed, the debtor is liable for any deficiency.
( 3) Disposition of the collateral may be by public or private
proceedings and may be made by way of one or more contracts.
Sale or other disposition may be as a unit or in parcels and at
any time and place and on any terms, but every aspect of the
disposition including the method, manner, time, place and terms
must be commercially reasonable. Unless collateral is perishable
or threatens to decline speedily in value or is of a type customarily sold on a recognized market, reasonable notification of
the time and place of any public sale or reasonable notification
of the time after which any private sale or other intended disposition is to be made shall be sent by the secured party to the debtor,
if he has not signed after default a statement renouncing or modifying his right to notification of sale . . .
70.A.-9-507. Secured Parties Liability for Failure to Comply
With This Part.
(I) If it is established that the secured party is not proceeding in accordance with the provisions of this party, disposition may be ordered or restrained on appropriate terms and conditions. If the disposition has occurred, the debtor or any person
entitled to notification or whose security interest has been made
known to the secured party prior to the disposition has a right
to recover from the secured party any loss caused by a failure
to comply with the provisions of this part . . .
( 2) The fact that a better price could have been obtained
by a sale at a different time or in a different method from that
selected by the secured party is not of itself sufficient to establish
that the sale was not made in a commercially reasonable manner. If the secured party either sells the collateral in the usual
manner in any recognized market therefor, or if he sells at the
price current in such market at the time of the sale, or if he has
otherwise sold in conformity with reasonable commercial prac-
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,,
tices among dealers in type of property sold he has sold in a
commercially manner ...
In dealing with the question of whether a creditor is entitled
to a deficiency judgment after having sold the collateral without
notice to the debtor there is a split of authority.
Some jurisdictions hold that failure to give notice to the debtor
of the sale of the collateral constitutes an absolute bar to a deficiency
judgment. The state jurisdictions that have so held are California,
Florida, Georgia, Maine, Nebraska. There are cases that have also
held in Iowa, Illinois, and New York. However, in these last three
jurisdictions there are also other cases that have allowed a deficiency
judgment.
In an analysis of the cases of these jurisdictions that do not allow a deficiency judgment the fallowing reasons have been given:
(I) Solution to the question is found in Pre-Code Law where under
comparable circumstances a deficiency judgment was denied. See
Skeels v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. 222 F. Supp. 696 (W.D.
Pa. 1963) . ( 2) Several state statutes contain provisions denying deficiency judgments when notice of the resale is not given: See:
White, Representing the Low-Income Consumer In Repossession,
Resales, and Deficiency Judgment Cases, 3 UCC L. J. 224. (3) Deficiency judgments have not been allowed where the secured transactions is in the form of an installment sale contract, particularly
where the contract did not provide for a deficiency judgment.
Other jurisdictions permit a recovery of a deficiency judgment
even though notice is not given by the creditor to the debtor of the
disposition of the collateral. The fallowing jurisdictions have so held:
Alaska:

Kobuk Engineering and Contract Services, Inc., v.
Superior Tank & Construction Co.-Alaska Inc.,
22 UCC Reporting Service 854

Arkansas:

Universal CIT Credit Company v. Rone, 453

Colorado:

s.w.

2d 37, (1970)

Community Management Assoc. of Colo. Springs
v. Tousley ( 1973) 11 UCC Reporting Service 1101
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Conn.:

Savings Bank of New Britian v. Booze, ( 1977)
23 UCC Reporting Service 556

Del.:

Ruston v. Shea (1976) 22 UCC Reporting Service
274

Kansas:

Barbour v. United States 22 UCC Reporting Service 850

Illinois:

Tauber v. Johnson (1972) 22 N. E. 2d 180

Indiana:

Hall v. Owen State Bank (197J) 23 UCC Reporting Service 267

Iowa:

Beneficial Financing Company of Black Hawk
County v. Reed (1973), 212 N.W. 2d 454

Nevada:

Levers v. Real King Land & Investment Co.
(1977) 21 UCC Reporting Service 344

N. Mex.:

Clark Leasing Corp. v. White Sands Forrest
Products, Inc. (1975) 87 N.M. 451, 535 P. 2d
1077

N. Y.:

Security Trust Company of Rochester v. Thomas
(1977) 22 UCC Reporting Service 1305

Wash.:

Merchants Leasing Company v. Clark (1975) 14
Wash. app. 317

From the jurisdictions allowing a deficiency judgment as noted
above, there has emerged a number of distinct positions regarding
the effect of a failure to notify. Some courts suggest that Section
9-507 of the Uniform Commercial Code (supra.) which provides
that the debtor has the right to recover from the secw·ed party any
loss occasioned by a failure to comply with the provisions relating
to the disposition of collateral is a sole, sufficient and adequate
remedy. In The Merchants Leasing Co. v. Clark 14 Wash. App.
317, 540 P. 2d 922 (1975) the court held that the creditor did not
lose his right to a deficiency judgment against the debtor by selling
the repossessed equipment without giving notice, but the debtor
would be entitled to have any damages caused to them by such lack
of notice credited gainst the deficiency judgment.
There are other jurisdictions that hold that a denial of the de-
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ficiency judgment deprives the secured party to be put in as good
a position as if the other party had fully performed. See: 409 Ore. L.

Rev. 65, 69 ( 1969).
Still other jurisdictions, such as Arkansas, announce the rule
that failure to give notice does not result in a bar to a deficiency
judgment but creates a presumption that the collateral was worth
at least the amount of the debt-that the burden is then placed on the
secured party to prove what would have been realized from a commercially reasonable sale. If the secured party is unable to overcome
the presumption, he recovers no deficiency. If the presumption is rebutted by the secured party proving the amount which would have
been realized from a commercially reasonable sale, such amount forms
the basis for computing the deficiency which the secured party will
be allowed. See Norton v. National Bank of Commerce, 240, Ark.
143, 398

s.w. 2d 538

(1966).

The no deficiency rule has been criticized by a number of law
review articles. In Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 7, 1973
p. 47 4 it is stated:
The Code must function on the theory that the overwhelming
number of commercial transactions are executed in good
faith, and this assumption is most likely accurate. In those
relatively few instances in which the secured party, for what
ever reason, has failed to comply with section 9-504 ( 3)
notice requirements, it is better to adopt a flexible standard
which would allow the secured party to be made whole and
yet which would protect the debtor on a case-by-case basis.
This protection is already afforded by 9-507: Such protection does not require an additional judicially created penalty denying the secured party's right to a deficiency judgment.
In _University of Colorado Law Review, Vol. 44, 1972, p. 230
it is stated:
The absolute defense approach produces a result which goes
beyond compensating the debtor for his loss and thus seems
to penalize the creditor. The debtor is relieved of the deficiency under this approach without even showing the loss.
This would seem inconsistent with the Code's policy against
punitive damages since it may place the debtor in a better
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position than he would have been had the creditor met the
requirements, all at the creditor's expense.
In Utah Law Review, Vol. 3, 1979 at p. 580 it is stated:
From the debtor's standpoint an automatic denial of a deficiency judgment for failure to notify is preferable to producing evidence of what would have happened had he been
notified or to proving the damage sustained through
being denied the right to redeem. This recogniton merely
exposes the major shortcoming of the no deficiency rule.
It creates a great potential for giving the debtor an undeserved remedy, thereby imposing a penalty on the secured
party, and undermining the U.C.C.'s announced policy
against windfalls and penalties. The realization that the no
deficiency rule applies indiscriminately to even inadvertant
or accidental omissions to notify only magnified the inadequacy of that position.
This jurisdiction has decided a number of cases in which the
matter of giving notice to the debtor was at issue. In Zion's First National Bank v. Hurst, 570 P. 2d 1031 (Utah 1977) the secured
creditor, Zion's First National Bank, sued the defendant to recover
$50,000.00, the amount of a Guaranty Agreement which the defendant had executed. The plaintiff's loan was secured by collateral
which included five airplanes. The airplanes were sold and realized
the sum of $72,500.00, which was applied to the total debt of $250,893.20, leaving a deficiency of $178,393.00. The extent of the defendant's guarantee was in the amount of $50,000.00. On appeal the
defendant alleged that the plaintiff did not notify him of the time
and place of the sale of the five airplanes and thus urged that the
plaintiff should be precluded from obtaining any deficiency judgment against him. Although the matter of notice was not raised in
the pleadings, the court stated in disposing of this issue :
More importantly, the usual rule is that failure to so notify
does not release the debtor from any deficiencies that may
arise: but upon such failure he may get credit for (or recover) only for any loss caused by the failure to so notify.
In that connection, inasmuch as the airplanes sold for $72,500.00, they would have to have brought nearly three times
that amount, that is $200,000.00 or more, before the pro-
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ceeds therefrom would have relieved the defendant from any
liability under his Guaranty.
In Cessna Finance Corp. v. Meyer, 575 P. 2d 1048, (Utah 1978)
the creditor brought an action against the guarantors to recover a
deficiency following repossession of the collateral. The debtor claimed
that the notice of the sale of the collateral was insufficient. The court
held that it was and stated:
An earlier case, Zion's v. Hurst, is dispositive of some of
the issues in this case . . . . This court held that Hurst had
not been damaged or prejudiced by the sale and cited the
general rule that a failure to notify does not release the
debtor-it merely affords him credit for any loss caused by
the failure to notify. This common law has been codified in
the Utah Uniform Commercial Code.

The court then cited Section 70 A-9-507.
In FM.A. Financial Corporation v. Pro-Printers et. al., 590 P.
2d 803, ( Utah-1979) the secured creditor asked for a deficiency
judgment in the amount of $21,97 5.96. The secured creditor repossessed some equipment and appraised the equipment at $10,250.00
on its repossession report. Four months earlier an appraiser in behalf of the debtor appraised the equipment. between $15,000.00 and
$17,000.00. The equipment was stored in a garage for eight months
and finally purchased by a third party for $4,500.00. The court held
that the secured creditor did not give notice of the sale and did not
dispose of the collateral in a commercially reasonable manner and
stated:
Because FMA did not give the required notice and did not
conduct the sale in a commercially reasonable manner, it is
barred from receiving a deficiency judgment. (Emphasis
added)
What do the Utah cases say? It has been noted that the Utah rule
has not been fully ennunciated. See Utah Law Review, Vol. 3 (1979)
page .567. The Cessna case, supra., and the Zion's case, supra, hold
that failure to notify the debtor of the sale of the collateral does not
release the debtor from any deficiency that may arise, but upon such
failure, the debtor may receive credit for any loss occasioned by the
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failure to give notice. The FMA case, supra, holds, at least on those
particular facts, where the secured creditor did not give notice and
did not dispose of the collateral in a commercially reasonable manner, they are not entitled to a deficiency.
To hold that f allure to give notice constitutes an absolute bar in
every fact situation creates windfalls, forefeitures and penalties. By
way of a hypothetical to illustrate, assume that a loaning institution
grants a loan to a debtor in the sum of $100,000.00. The debtor had
a substantial net worth. The bank did not require full security but
did take a security agreement wherein $10,000.00 worth of collateral
was pledged.
The debtor defaults, and the creditor repossesses the collateral,
but neglects to give notice of the sale of the collateral. The collateral
is disposed of in a commercially reasonable manner. The creditor
thereupon has a deficiency in the amount of $90,000.00. To bar a
deficiency judgment in this hypothetical case for failure to give
notice would be a windfall to the debtor and would constitute a forfeiture and penalty-all contrary to the spirit of the UCC.
The facts in the present case are similar. Defendants signed a
promissory note in the amount of $198,240.00. This amount included
a dishonored check in the amount of $41,400.00 and a personal loan
in the amount of $8,500.00. The amount also represented $57,500.00
sold out of trust. There was a discussion and understanding among
the parties that there would be a deficiency even after applying the
sales proceeds of all of the collateral. There was some mention by
Dr. Quinn that he would sell some property in Texas to cover the remaining deficiency-which was never done.
As to the disposition of the collateral, the jury found that the
collateral was disposed of in a commercially reasonable manner, and
the facts are more than sufficient to show that the collateral was
disposed of in a commercially reasonable manner.

In American State Insurance Co. v. Miller, Adams and Crawford, 557 P. 2d 756 (Utah 1976) sureties obtained a deficiency judgment against defendants who were parties to a construction bond.
The judgment was obtained by default, but the defendants later on
made a motion to compel satisfaction of the default judgment on
the basis that the surety failed to notify the defendants of the sale of
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certain collateral that was pledged as security for the surety bond.
The motion was denied. Justice Crockett, in a concurring opinion
stated:
It is undoubtedly true that the requirement of Section
7 A-9-504 (3) tha"t the secured creditor (plaintiff) give the
debtor (defendants) notice of sale of the collateral is to afford the debtor an opportunity to see that a fair price is paid
therefor and that he get adequate credit on his debt.
It strikes me as unrealistic and unfair to rule that, regardless of actual value, the sale of the pledged property
is worth only a small fraction of the judgment and thus the
plaintiff would be cheated out of the remainder of his debt.
On the other hand, to permit the creditor to sell the pledged
property without notice may result in its being sold for
much less than its fair value and thus deprive the debtor of
credit he is entitled to.
It is my view that the court should not apply any unvarying and rigid rule, but should examine the total situation and determine what is fair and reasonable. Justice requires the rule to be that if the sale of the collateral is not
conducted according to the requirements of the statute, that
should neither automatically and conclusively bar the plaintiff from claiming payment of the rest of the judgment, nor
should the amount received at the sale be regarded as conclusive evidence that the fair value of the property was received, and thus determine the amount which the defense
are entitled to as credit on the judgment.

POINT II
FAILURE TO GIVE NOTICE REQUIRED BY SECTION
70A-9-504 DOES NOT AS A MATTER OF LAW MAKE
THE SALE OF, COLLATERAL COMMERCIALLY UNREASON ABLE.
Appellants urge in their brief that since the Respondent did not
give written notice to Appellants of the sale of the collateral, that
the sale, therefore, was not made in a commercially reasonable manner.
This is not so and is not in accordance with the law. Section
70A-9-504 (3) provides:
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(3) Disposition of the collateral may be by public or private proceedings and made by way of one or more contracts. Sale or
other disposition may be as a unit or in parcels and at any time
and place and on any terms but every aspect of the disposUion including the method, manner, time, place and terms must be commercially reasonable. (Emphasis added)
Section 70A-9-507 ( 2) provides:

( 2) . . . . If the secured party either sells the collateral in the
usual manner in any resognized market therefor or if he sells at
the price current in such market at the time of his sale or if he luis
otherwise sold in conformity with reasonahle commercial practices among dealers in the type of property sold he has sold in a
commercially reasonable manner. The principles stated in the
two preceeding sentences with respect to sales also apply as may
be appropriate to other types of disposition. (Emphasis added)
The foregoing strongly and clearly indicates that the requirement of notice to the debtor is separate and apart from the requirements of disposition of collateral in a commercially reasonable manner. In North Carolina National Bank v. Burnette, 247 S.E. 2d 648,
(N.C. 1978) the court held that the notice that is required to be
given regarding the sale of collateral is separate and distinct from
the requirement of commercial reasonableness.
Apparentsly the Utah court also recognizes that the notice requirement and the requirements of commercial reasonableness are
distinct and separate. In the FM.A case, supra, the court stated:
Because FMA did not give the required notice and did not conduct the sale in a commercially reasonable manner, it is barred
from receiving a deficiency judgment. (Emphasis added)
POINT III
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO GIVE DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 7 RELATING TO THE ELEMENTS OF A COMMERCIALLY
REASON ABLE SALE.
Appellants further urge that the Court erred in failing to give
Appellants' requested jury instruction No. 7. The court did give the
fallowing instructions relating to commercially reasonableness:
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INSTRUCTION NO. 15
Disposition of the collateral may be by public or private proceedings and may be made by way of one or more contracts. Sale
or other disposition may be as a unit or in parcels and at any time
and place and on terms but every aspect of the disposition including the method, manner, time, place and terms must be commercially reasonable . . .

INSTRUCTION NO. 16
The fact that a better price could have been obtained by a sale
at a different time or in a different method from that selected
by the secured party is not of itself sufficient to establish that
the sale was not made in a commercially reasonable manner. If
the secured party either sells the collateral in the usual manner in
any recognized market therefor or if he sells at the price current in such market at the time of his sale or if he has otherwise
sold in conformity with reasonable commercial practices among
dealers in the type of property sold he has sold in a commercially reasonable manner.

INSTRUCTION NO. 17
While the requirement that the collateral must be disposed of in
a commercially reasonable manner may not be waived. Utah
State law provides that the parties may by agreement determine
the standards by which the fulfillment of this requirement is to be
measured if such standards are not manifestly unreasonable.
The foregoing instructions comport with the statutory provisiions
relating to commercial reasonableness and include the basic elements
of that principle.

POINT IV
THERE IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE THAT THE APPELLANT DISPOSED OF THE COLLATERAL IN A
COMMERCIALLY REASONABLE MANNER.
There is more than adequate evidence that the Appellant disposed of the collateral in a commercially reasonable manner. When
the collateral was repossessed there was a joint discussion and agreement between the parties that the collateral should be sold and that
the cars should be displayed on car dealer lots. (Tr. 22, 86) The
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automobiles were displayed on various lots and sold for the highest
available prices. (Tr. 52, 67, 73) One of the vehicles was sold to a
private party after advertising in the newspaper. (Tr. 28) Prior to
the respective sales some of the automobiles (as were needed) were
repaired. (Tr. 30, 69, 70, 71) The Appellant and the various car
dealers which were displaying the automobiles for sale, advertised in
local papers. (Tr. 28, 29) The prices realized from the sale of the
automobiles were fair and reasonable. (Tr. 73)
Appellants suggest that since the Respondent did not advertize
in trade journals such as Road & Track and Auto Week, that the
cars were not sold in a commercially reasonable manner. But, it is
worthy to note that Appellants' own expert witness,
Ray Pellum,
i
stated: that he sold for Bavarian Motors who deal solely with European, sports and exotic cars; and that their sales offices are located
in Salt Lake City; and furtherQ.

And isn't it true, that the majority of their sales are to people within the Utah area?

A.

That's right. (Tr. 130)

An expert called by Appellant, Randall Aagaard, (who incidentally sold some of the cars for Appellant) testified on cross examination: (Tr. 81)
Q.

A.

Would it be fair to state that in order to reach the best market for an exotic foreign car, the best place to advertise
would be in Road and Track magazine or Auto Week?
Well, I thought that, but I done quite a bit of advertising

in both of them and never had any luck whatsoever in either
publication.
Q.

You've never sold a car through either publication?

A. No.
The disposition of the collateral was disposed of consistant with
70A-9-501 which provides:
The parties may by agreement determine the standards by which
the fulfillment of these rights and duties is to be measured if such
standards are not manifestly unreasonable.
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In Mount Vernon Dodge, Inc. v. Seattle-First National Bank,
570 P. 2d 702, (Wash. 1977) the secured ,creditor repossessed
among other things, an automobile inventory and sold the same at a
private sale. The court stated:
Answering the additional contention of the debtor, we note that
a private sale rather than a public sale was permissible. The collateral disposed of consisted of new and used cars, trucks and
campers. These items are customarily sold in a recognized market
and are subject of widely distributed standard price quotations.
. . . . We disagree with the assertion that the disposition was not
commercially reasonable due to the failure to display and sell
the vehicles as a retail dealer. Section 9-507, Official Comment .2
of the Uniform Commercial Code states:
One recognized method of disposing of repossessed collateral
is for the secured party to sell the collateral to or through
a dealer-a method which in the long run may realize better
average returns since the secured party does not usually
maintain his own facilities for making such sales. Such
method of sale, fairly conducted, is recognized as commercially reasonable under the second sentence of sub-section 2.
. . . . The creditor was not engaged in retail automobile sales,
and is not required to be so engaged to dispose of such collateral
under RCW 62A 9-504 and 507.
POINT V
THERE WAS LEGAL CONSIDERATION GIVEN BY
DR. QUINN FOR EXECUTION OF THE NEW NOTE.
Appellants suggest that there was inadequate consideration
given by Dr. Quinn for the new note. Initially Dr. Quinn signed a
Continuing Guaranty in the amount of $180,000.00. After the repossession of the collateral a promissory note was prepared by the
Respondent and signed by the Appellants representing the total
amount due of $198,240.00. Appellants argue that this note is not
supported by legal consideration. This point needs little argument
as the long standing uniform rule is that a note given to pay a third
person's debt is supported by valuable consideration. See 11 .Am Jur
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2d, Bills and Notes, Sec. 227, Southern Frozen Foods v. Hill, 129
SE 2d 420.

CONCLUSION
Accordingly, Respondents respectfully urge that judgment of
the lower court in awarding Respondent a deficiency judgment be
affirmed.
Respectfully submitted this 11th day of April, 1980.

Layne B. Forbes

A.ttorney for Plaintiff-Respondent
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